企业理论管理行为代理成本与所有权结构

❶ “公司所有权结构”是什么

公司所有权结构就是股权结构。公司的所有者就是公司股东，即公司出资者。公内司成立后容，公司的所有权结构是指股东所持股份之间的比例关系。

现代企业理论学者认为 ,“企业所有权”是对企业的剩余索取权和剩余控制权,它由谁拥有依存于企业经营的不同状态 ,这种说法是不科学的 ;剩余索取权和剩余控制权实质是企业中存在的产权而不是真正的企业所有权 ;真正的企业所有权是指企业出资者的所有权

(1)企业理论管理行为代理成本与所有权结构扩展阅读：

所有权决定经营权、收益权、处分权。因此公司的重大问题需要股东大会决议，按票数原则来通过。为了保护中小投资者利益，公司法规定修改章程存续发展的有限公司如果有1/3以上票数的股东不同意，就不能通过；上市公司股改中如果1/3以上票数的股东不同意，股改方案也不能通过。

参考资料：企业所有权理论_网络

❷ 请问哪位有Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure 中文翻译

企业理论：管理行为，代理成本与所有权结构

❸ Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure 中文翻译

雅虎翻译： 企业的理论： 管理行为、代办处费用和所有权构成
google翻译：理论的事务所：管理行为，代理成本与所有权结构
有道翻译：企业理论:管理行为、代理成本和股权结构

❹ 帮我翻译下英文 不要翻译器的 高手来

1985 entered Harvard Business School to teach the Jensen, Deputy Economics as one of the founders, Jason McLean in 1976 and released the "Enterprise Theory: manager, agent costs and ownership structure", the article has absorbed agent theory , Property rights theory and financial theory, put forward the "agency costs" concept and structure of corporate ownership. The paper also quoted companies in the field of theoretical maximum of one of the classic papers.
In the modern business theory, on the nature of business, Jensen and McLean believes that the traditional neo-classical economics of the business theory, in fact play an important role in the enterprise market theory. Enterprises as a "black box", according to outputs and inputs on the marginal conditions of operation in order to achieve profits or maximize the present value. The traditional business theory can not explain all the participants conflicting corporate goal is to achieve balanced and how to achieve profits or maximize the present value, but also can not explain the "ownership and control of separation" phenomenon, as well as the manager of the company's behaviour. At the same time, the ownership of theory, research and external equity and debt costs generated by the agent. Acting on the cost of debt, and its main points are:
1. Acting costs - the root causes of debt constraints. When the managers of enterprises have not entirely the property rights of enterprises, there will be agency costs, namely, the existence of agents and clients of the conflict of interest, it will inevitably have a client trying to monitor and binding agents, to achieve the minimum loss of surplus, This is a debt of about the root causes.
2. Why have corporate debt - debt incentives. Enterprises can assume that the cost of the two equal and mutually exclusive investment opportunities to choose, each investment opportunities in the future a certain period of a random return, for the sake of simplification, the assumption that these two opportunities are lognormal distribution, and have the same The expected total return, the only difference in the distribution of different variance, the assumption that a programme of the variance is less than the variance of the programme, two of the total market value is the same. If the owners and operators of the right to choose investment opportunities, and then while in the form of debt or equity sale of some or all of the results obtained from the right, it is no difference between the two investment opportunities. However, if they have the opportunity to borrow, after the investment decision, and then sold on the market some or all of the remaining stake from the right, then these two investment opportunities is not no difference at all. Because it promised to invest in low-variance projects, issue bonds, and then they do high variance, can transfer wealth from creditors to where his own - in the hands of stake holders.
3. And the supervision of the debt guarantee - bound by the role of liabilities. Creditors can seek to limit these losses, but this will be in control costs, such as the debt contract into a variety of guarantee provisions, the bondholders can lead to restrictions on those bonds to rece the value of the management, and the bond Issue, involving such as dividends, future bond issuance and maintenance of capital flows, and other aspects of management decision-making and other restrictions.
4. Insolvency and liquidation of the debt costs - bound by the role of liabilities. If the business can not promptly discharge the debt, or breach of contract in terms of the bankruptcy, enterprises will go bankrupt. At this time the loss of all shareholders the right to obtain the remaining fixed at face value and the right to difference between the value of the enterprise market losses by creditors burden. General creditors of bankrupt enterprises will bankrupt the right to terminate the work of managers, dedicated to terminate any future human capital gains or he may get the rent.
Jensen and in McLean, the enterprise is the nature of contractual relationships. They defined as a business organization. Most such organizations and other organizations, is a legal fiction, its functions is to a group of indivials between the contractual relationship as connecting points on the enterprise, this is "a group of contractual relations" is the owner of labor, material input and capital The provision of inputs, outputs of consumer goods the contractual relationship between three parties. Here both the contractual relationship we usually understand the express written or oral contracts, including leases not clear, the so-called "tacit understanding." From this point of view, the personification of enterprises, for instance, asked the companies what is the objective function is seriously misleading. Business is not personal, but many indivials in the lease conflict objectives of the framework to achieve balance in the complex process of focus. Therefore, the concept of property rights there will be a decision on how the costs and rewards of an organization distributed among the participants in some of the broader meaning. As is usually the right or open or secret from the provisions of the contract, so indivial organizations, including managerial personnel, depends on the nature of these leases. In other words, deeds, especially business owners and operators under a contract between the property rights, should have a clear meaning of the act.

❺ 急求 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure 的中文翻译

企业理论的管理行为、代理成本、产权结构

❻ 管理者的代理成本是什么

公司收购的目的是多方面的，根据现有理论研究，产生了不同的理论，区分为以下...代理理论从企业所有权结构入手提出了代理成本，包括所有者与代理人订立契约成本...