企業理論管理行為代理成本與所有權結構

❶ 「公司所有權結構」是什麼

公司所有權結構就是股權結構。公司的所有者就是公司股東，即公司出資者。公內司成立後容，公司的所有權結構是指股東所持股份之間的比例關系。

現代企業理論學者認為 ,「企業所有權」是對企業的剩餘索取權和剩餘控制權,它由誰擁有依存於企業經營的不同狀態 ,這種說法是不科學的 ;剩餘索取權和剩餘控制權實質是企業中存在的產權而不是真正的企業所有權 ;真正的企業所有權是指企業出資者的所有權

(1)企業理論管理行為代理成本與所有權結構擴展閱讀：

所有權決定經營權、收益權、處分權。因此公司的重大問題需要股東大會決議，按票數原則來通過。為了保護中小投資者利益，公司法規定修改章程存續發展的有限公司如果有1/3以上票數的股東不同意，就不能通過；上市公司股改中如果1/3以上票數的股東不同意，股改方案也不能通過。

參考資料：企業所有權理論_網路

❷ 請問哪位有Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure 中文翻譯

企業理論：管理行為，代理成本與所有權結構

❸ Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure 中文翻譯

雅虎翻譯： 企業的理論： 管理行為、代辦處費用和所有權構成
google翻譯：理論的事務所：管理行為，代理成本與所有權結構
有道翻譯：企業理論:管理行為、代理成本和股權結構

❹ 幫我翻譯下英文 不要翻譯器的 高手來

1985 entered Harvard Business School to teach the Jensen, Deputy Economics as one of the founders, Jason McLean in 1976 and released the "Enterprise Theory: manager, agent costs and ownership structure", the article has absorbed agent theory , Property rights theory and financial theory, put forward the "agency costs" concept and structure of corporate ownership. The paper also quoted companies in the field of theoretical maximum of one of the classic papers.
In the modern business theory, on the nature of business, Jensen and McLean believes that the traditional neo-classical economics of the business theory, in fact play an important role in the enterprise market theory. Enterprises as a "black box", according to outputs and inputs on the marginal conditions of operation in order to achieve profits or maximize the present value. The traditional business theory can not explain all the participants conflicting corporate goal is to achieve balanced and how to achieve profits or maximize the present value, but also can not explain the "ownership and control of separation" phenomenon, as well as the manager of the company's behaviour. At the same time, the ownership of theory, research and external equity and debt costs generated by the agent. Acting on the cost of debt, and its main points are:
1. Acting costs - the root causes of debt constraints. When the managers of enterprises have not entirely the property rights of enterprises, there will be agency costs, namely, the existence of agents and clients of the conflict of interest, it will inevitably have a client trying to monitor and binding agents, to achieve the minimum loss of surplus, This is a debt of about the root causes.
2. Why have corporate debt - debt incentives. Enterprises can assume that the cost of the two equal and mutually exclusive investment opportunities to choose, each investment opportunities in the future a certain period of a random return, for the sake of simplification, the assumption that these two opportunities are lognormal distribution, and have the same The expected total return, the only difference in the distribution of different variance, the assumption that a programme of the variance is less than the variance of the programme, two of the total market value is the same. If the owners and operators of the right to choose investment opportunities, and then while in the form of debt or equity sale of some or all of the results obtained from the right, it is no difference between the two investment opportunities. However, if they have the opportunity to borrow, after the investment decision, and then sold on the market some or all of the remaining stake from the right, then these two investment opportunities is not no difference at all. Because it promised to invest in low-variance projects, issue bonds, and then they do high variance, can transfer wealth from creditors to where his own - in the hands of stake holders.
3. And the supervision of the debt guarantee - bound by the role of liabilities. Creditors can seek to limit these losses, but this will be in control costs, such as the debt contract into a variety of guarantee provisions, the bondholders can lead to restrictions on those bonds to rece the value of the management, and the bond Issue, involving such as dividends, future bond issuance and maintenance of capital flows, and other aspects of management decision-making and other restrictions.
4. Insolvency and liquidation of the debt costs - bound by the role of liabilities. If the business can not promptly discharge the debt, or breach of contract in terms of the bankruptcy, enterprises will go bankrupt. At this time the loss of all shareholders the right to obtain the remaining fixed at face value and the right to difference between the value of the enterprise market losses by creditors burden. General creditors of bankrupt enterprises will bankrupt the right to terminate the work of managers, dedicated to terminate any future human capital gains or he may get the rent.
Jensen and in McLean, the enterprise is the nature of contractual relationships. They defined as a business organization. Most such organizations and other organizations, is a legal fiction, its functions is to a group of indivials between the contractual relationship as connecting points on the enterprise, this is "a group of contractual relations" is the owner of labor, material input and capital The provision of inputs, outputs of consumer goods the contractual relationship between three parties. Here both the contractual relationship we usually understand the express written or oral contracts, including leases not clear, the so-called "tacit understanding." From this point of view, the personification of enterprises, for instance, asked the companies what is the objective function is seriously misleading. Business is not personal, but many indivials in the lease conflict objectives of the framework to achieve balance in the complex process of focus. Therefore, the concept of property rights there will be a decision on how the costs and rewards of an organization distributed among the participants in some of the broader meaning. As is usually the right or open or secret from the provisions of the contract, so indivial organizations, including managerial personnel, depends on the nature of these leases. In other words, deeds, especially business owners and operators under a contract between the property rights, should have a clear meaning of the act.

❺ 急求 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure 的中文翻譯

企業理論的管理行為、代理成本、產權結構

❻ 管理者的代理成本是什麼

公司收購的目的是多方面的，根據現有理論研究，產生了不同的理論，區分為以下...代理理論從企業所有權結構入手提出了代理成本，包括所有者與代理人訂立契約成本...